🇮🇱 Israel Nuclear Arsenal

In 2025, Israel has a total of 90 nuclear warheads.

Israel is still officially silent about possessing the bomb, but open-source evidence shows it sits on a small, mature and steadily modernising deterrent, backed by a tri-vector delivery system and a robust second-strike capability. Opacity (“amimut”) remains the cornerstone of strategy, yet Tel Aviv continues to upgrade every leg of the force while quietly refurbishing its plutonium infrastructure, ensuring that its arsenal stays credible against Iran and any future regional nuclear aspirants.

Israel’s military stockpile is unchanged in recent years and held outside declared readiness protocols.

• Warheads rely on plutonium produced at the Negev Nuclear Research Center (Dimona), which is undergoing new construction and safety upgrades, signalling life-extension of the fissile-material pipeline.
• No public evidence of yield diversification, but analysts believe Israel maintains a mix of low- to mid-hundred-kiloton devices optimised for missile and cruise-missile payloads.
• Alert posture is deliberately low: warheads are reportedly stored in dis-assembled form, with rapid-assembly procedures and pre-planned dispersal paths rather than permanent deployment on launchers.
• Modernisation focuses on new missile propulsion tests, digital fire-control, hardened storage and improved command-and-control links that can survive cyber and kinetic disruption.

Force structure and major vectors

Land (ballistic missiles)

• Jericho III: Three-stage solid-fuel IR/ICBM, 4,000–6,000 km class, single or limited MIRV payloads. Operational since 2011 and now the backbone of Israel’s prompt-strike option.
• Jericho IV (probable): Foreign-reported test shots and propulsion trials in 2024 hint at an extended-range (≈6,000 km) upgrade, offering global reach and better penetration aids.

Sea (submarine-launched cruise missiles)

• Dolphin- & Dolphin II-class SSKs (five in service; INS Drakon on sea trials) provide a covert second-strike platform; three larger Dakar-class boats are on order for late-decade delivery.
• Popeye Turbo SLCM, estimated ≈1,500 km range with a 200 kt nuclear warhead, is widely believed to be the primary payload for the 650 mm tubes.

Air (dual-capable fighter-bombers)

• F-15I Ra’am and upgraded F-16I Sufa remain certified for gravity-bomb delivery and standoff missiles.
• F-35I Adir: Israel’s bespoke testbed jet and software sovereignty give it the option to integrate nuclear ordnance once politically authorised; the baseline F-35A platform was certified for the B61-12 in 2024, underscoring the technical pathway.

Outlook

• Stockpile size will likely stay in the 80–110 range; capacity exists to expand, but strategy prizes minimum sufficient deterrence wrapped in opacity.
• Delivery systems will keep advancing: Jericho IV (or a follow-on solid-fuel ICBM) should reach full operational status by 2027–28; the Dakar submarines will complete a credible continuous-at-sea posture; and Block 4/5 F-35Is will add low-observable penetration to the air leg.
• Infrastructure upgrades at Dimona suggest continued plutonium production or at least hot-cell refurbishment for core remanufacture, ensuring warhead longevity into the 2040s.
• Strategic posture will still hinge on deliberate ambiguity, but growing Iranian enrichment capacity and potential Saudi nuclear hedging mean Israel is unlikely to join any binding arms-control regime in the near term. Expect incremental transparency gestures—satellite-monitored test notifications, safety cooperation—without formal acknowledgment.