Does Belarus have nuclear weapons of its own?

No. Belarus is a non-nuclear-weapon state under the NPT. It hosts an estimated unknown number of Russian warheads that remain under Russia's custody; they could only be used by joint decision, and Belarus owns none of them.

Where are the Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus stored?

Storage infrastructure has been identified near Asipovichy, but independent analysts cannot confirm that warheads are permanently present on Belarusian territory.

Russian Nuclear Weapons in Belarus: Basing, Systems, Status

Overview

Belarus has hosted Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons since 2023, the first foreign basing of Russian warheads since the post-Soviet withdrawal completed in 1996. Moscow and Minsk announced the arrangement in March 2023; storage infrastructure has been identified near Asipovichy, and estimates of warheads actually present run from a handful to several dozen, with independent analysts cautious about how many, if any, are permanently stored on Belarusian soil. The warheads remain under Russian custody.

Delivery systems are Belarusian-operated Iskander-M missile brigades and Su-25 aircraft adapted for a nuclear role, with Russian-supplied training. The 2022 constitutional referendum removed the country's non-nuclear status, unwinding a founding commitment of its independence.

On 30 December 2025 Russia's Defence Ministry declared a unit of its Strategic Missile Forces armed with the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile on combat duty in Belarus. Unlike the Iskander brigades and the Su-25s, the Oreshnik unit is operated by Russian forces, not Belarusian ones. Satellite imagery analysed by Janes and by researchers at Middlebury and CNA points to the former Krichev-6 airbase, about 5 km from the Russian border and under construction since August 2025, as the likely site; the location has not been officially confirmed.

Belarus inherited Soviet strategic warheads at independence and transferred them to Russia by 1996 under the Budapest Memorandum's security assurances, an arc from disarmament to re-hosting that makes it the mirror image of the NATO sharing states, whose arrangement Moscow cites as precedent.

The Zapad-2025 exercise with Russia rehearsed the planning around nuclear-capable systems. Satellite imagery shows the Asipovichy-area storage site complete and guarded, though whether warheads sit there permanently remains unverifiable. Each step, from the Iskander brigades to the Russian-run Oreshnik unit, binds Belarus more tightly into Russian strategic planning.