Missile Hwasong-11A

The Hwasong-11A, designated KN-23 by the United States and 19-1 SRBM by South Korea, is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled short-range ballistic missile. A solid-fuel motor, possibly for this missile, was apparently static-tested at Hamhung in October 2017. The missile was first displayed at the 8 February 2018 military parade and first test-fired on 4 May 2019. North Korea referred to it by generic terms such as "tactical guided weapon" until it confirmed the Hwasong-11A designation at the Weaponry Exhibition-2023 in July 2023. Analysts suspect foreign involvement in its development, including components. Ukrainian assessments state it is not a direct copy or licensed production of the Iskander.

The missile resembles the Russian Iskander-M and South Korean Hyunmoo-2B. It can be distinguished by its elongated cable raceway, different jet vane actuators and smooth base. It is larger than the Iskander. Its motor likely shares the Pukguksong-1 diameter but is lengthened and uses a single stage. It flies a quasi-ballistic trajectory and flattens out in the lower atmosphere, where its fins can alter course. It can fly depressed trajectories, perform a terminal pull-up maneuver, pitch down to strike from directly above, and extend range using aerodynamic lift. Its flight profile is considered too low for THAAD and too high for the MIM-104 Patriot to intercept reliably.

Guidance is inertial, possibly supplemented by satellite navigation. Estimated CEP is 35–200 m, and missiles used in Ukraine were reported in February 2025 to achieve 50–100 m. Conflict Armament Research found that most guidance-system components in missiles fired at Kharkiv were based on American parts. A 2026 Ukrainian report described commercial electronics built with outdated manufacturing methods and a less energy-efficient propellant.

Warhead options include:

• Conventional unitary warheads
• Air-burst warheads, tested in January 2022
• Submunition warheads, which North Korea claimed in April 2026 cover 6.5–7 hectares
• Nuclear warheads, including the Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead. Tests in March 2023 simulated nuclear strikes with warheads detonating at low altitude above the target.

Launch platforms include:

• An 8×8 wheeled TEL and a tracked launcher, each carrying two missiles
• Rail cars, first used on 15 September 2021
• Underground silos. The first known North Korean silo launch took place at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station on 19 March 2023.

Derivatives include the larger Hwasong-11C, the smaller Hwasong-11D, the Hwasong-11E hypersonic glide vehicle variant and the Hwasong-11S submarine-launched version.

The missile is operated by the Korean People's Army Strategic Force and is expected to replace the liquid-fueled Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6. The IISS lists road- and rail-mobile launchers in service. Images from Kim Jong Un's factory inspections in December 2025 and June 2026 indicated mass production for conventional use. Test launches continued in May 2025, April 2026 and September 2026.

Russia is the only foreign operator. North Korean ballistic missiles were transferred to Russia in October 2023, according to declassified US intelligence. Debris from Russian strikes on 30 December 2023 showed Hwasong-11A features, including a barometer marked with a Hangul character. The missile was used in the Kharkiv strikes of 2 January 2024, and a UN Security Council panel confirmed its identity on 29 April 2024. In May 2024, Ukrainian officials reported that about half of the missiles lost their programmed trajectories and exploded in the air. Further debris was recovered at Bila Tserkva, Vitrova Balka and Rozhivka. Ukraine reported its use in the 23 April 2025 attack on Kyiv. In August 2026, Ukraine claimed that North Korea had delivered additional missiles and would deploy a missile unit with launchers.