Syrian Arab Navy

The Syrian Arab Navy of the Ba'athist period was dissolved with the collapse of the Assad government on 8 December 2024. On the nights of 9–10 December 2024, Israeli naval and air strikes against Latakia port and the anchorage at Minet el-Beida destroyed the bulk of the fleet — some fifteen hulls, including Osa I and Osa II missile boats — along with stocks of P-15 Termit, Nur and C-802 anti-ship missiles. Most of those units were already non-operational after years without maintenance. Petya II frigates and Romeo submarines had been withdrawn earlier, and an intended order for Amur-1650 submarines from Russia was never realised.

The naval arm reconstituted under the transitional government fields no submarines, principal surface combatants or amphibious ships. What remains consists of offshore patrol craft, fast interceptors, armed civilian hulls and rescue boats, largely inherited from the previous inventory and repaired locally. Coast guard small-boat units, subordinate to the Interior Ministry, were re-formed first and appeared publicly at Tartus and Latakia in January 2025.

Command runs from Damascus through the Ministry of Defence, with the President as commander-in-chief. A brigadier general commands the naval forces. Basing follows the pre-2024 pattern: Latakia as the main installation, with berthing and ship-repair facilities, plus Tartus, Baniyas and Minet el-Beida. Coastal defence and marine elements are subordinate to the naval command, while the army's 56th Division handles ground security in the Latakia and Tartus governorates.

Activity is confined to Syrian territorial waters. Routine patrolling resumed in April 2025, followed by an anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking operation in May 2025. Coast guard units have intercepted irregular migration attempts off the western coast, including a departure prevented in August 2026. There have been no deployments beyond the immediate littoral.

The 2017 lease granting Russia use of Tartus was repudiated by Damascus, and Russian withdrawal proceeded through 2025 and into 2026. Under a memorandum announced in August 2026, Syria assumed civil administration of Hmeimim and of the commercial berth at Tartus, while military facilities at both sites are to function as joint training centres.

Turkey has become the principal external partner. A military training and consultancy agreement signed on 13 August 2025 covers instruction, technical assistance and reciprocal visits; Syrian naval cadets entered Turkish academies from October 2025. The frigate TCG Istanbul visited Latakia in July 2025, the first Turkish naval call since the war, and the Syrian naval commander toured the Turkish fleet command and the frigate TCG Kemalreis at Kocaeli in September 2025. Turkish plans for a naval facility at Latakia have been reported but not confirmed.

Syria has no domestic warship construction. Proposals for Turkish-built coastal patrol boats and interceptors remain unfulfilled, and no new hulls have been confirmed as delivered. Port capacity at Tartus and Latakia is being redeveloped under concessions held by DP World and CMA CGM respectively.