Nuclear weapons of Russia

Russia holds the world's largest nuclear inventory: roughly 5,420 warheads, of which about 4,400 form the military stockpile and an estimated 1,020 are retired and awaiting dismantlement. Around 1,800 warheads are deployed on strategic forces, and Russia also fields the world's largest stock of nonstrategic warheads, generally estimated at well over a thousand.

The triad rests on silo-based and road-mobile Yars ICBMs, with the heavy RS-28 Sarmat still not operational, Borei- and Delta IV-class submarines carrying Bulava and Sineva missiles, and Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers with long-range cruise missiles. A set of novel systems sits alongside the triad: the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, carried on converted SS-19 missiles, the Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo, the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and the Oreshnik intermediate-range missile, first fired against Ukraine in November 2024 and used again on 9 January 2026 against the Lviv region. Moscow and Minsk say nonstrategic warheads have been forward-deployed to Belarus since 2023, the first such basing abroad since the Soviet withdrawal; independent analysts have not confirmed warheads on site. Lukashenko said the Oreshnik system entered combat duty in Belarus on 17 December 2025, and joint tactical nuclear drills in May 2026 rehearsed the delivery and transfer of nuclear munitions.

Russia suspended its participation in New START in 2023 and revoked its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty the same year. A revised doctrine published in November 2024 widened the stated conditions for nuclear use. New START expired by its own terms in February 2026, after Washington rejected Putin's offer of a one-year mutual extension in favour of a new treaty. On 11 February 2026 the Russian foreign ministry said Moscow would observe the old ceilings only while the United States does not exceed them, a restraint it can abandon at will. In September and October 2026 Russia expressed tentative openness to a trilateral meeting proposed by the US president.

The signals hardened from late 2025. Moscow claimed a successful Burevestnik test on 21 October 2025 and a Poseidon test on 28 October; FAS notes the Burevestnik had around a dozen earlier failures and that only four of nine launcher garages near Vologda-20 were complete in March 2026, while Poseidon remains non-operational. Khabarovsk, the second Poseidon-carrying submarine, was launched on 1 November 2025. On 5 November 2025 Putin ordered proposals on possible preparations for a nuclear test, with the defence minister recommending Novaya Zemlya; no Russian explosive test has been reported.

Moscow puts the modern share of its strategic forces above 95 percent, but FAS assesses the modernization as proceeding much more slowly than planned, citing the Sarmat, the Tu-160M and the Borei programme. The Sarmat failed again in November 2025 before logging a second successful full test on 12 May 2026; Moscow plans its first regiment at Uzhur by the end of 2026, though none was yet on alert in early 2026.