Myanmar/ Burma Air Force

The Myanmar Air Force (MAF) is structured primarily as a counter-insurgency (COIN) and army support force, a role that has defined its existence and has been brought into sharp focus since the 2021 military coup. Its strategic doctrine is deeply entwined with the Tatmadaw's (Myanmar Armed Forces) overarching "four cuts" strategy, which aims to sever the links between insurgent groups and their sources of funding, food, intelligence, and recruits. In this context, the MAF's main operational capability is providing close air support, transport, and logistics for ground forces. Since 2021, as the military junta has faced significant ground losses, the MAF has become its most crucial asset, increasingly relied upon to conduct punitive airstrikes against both armed groups and civilian areas to suppress dissent and project power.

Operationally, the MAF has proven its capability to conduct sustained air campaigns across the country from key bases like Meiktila, Magwe, and Taungoo. It employs a mix of assets, with advanced trainer aircraft like the Yak-130 and K-8, and older F-7 jets, forming the backbone of its ground-attack fleet. The operational tempo has increased significantly, providing pilots with extensive combat experience, which has reportedly improved their targeting accuracy over time. However, this has come at a cost. The MAF faces considerable challenges from increasingly sophisticated anti-aircraft capabilities of resistance forces, including the use of MANPADS, which have resulted in the loss of several aircraft, including a modern JF-17 fighter.

Modernization has been a consistent goal since the 1990s, aimed at reducing dependence on aged Chinese platforms. This has been pursued through partnerships with Russia and China, leading to the acquisition of key platforms like the MiG-29, Yak-130, FTC-2000G, and most notably, six Su-30SME multirole fighters delivered by the end of 2024. While the Su-30s represent a significant leap in potential capability, suggesting a secondary doctrinal consideration for conventional deterrence against neighbors, the MAF's overall fleet modernization is plagued by severe issues. The fleet of Pakistani/Chinese JF-17s has been largely grounded due to structural and maintenance problems, exacerbated by international sanctions that restrict access to spare parts and aviation fuel. This has forced the MAF to improvise, reportedly modifying transport aircraft for bombing roles to mitigate the shortage of dedicated attack platforms.

Regionally, the MAF is not positioned to project significant power beyond its borders. Compared to the Royal Thai Air Force, which operates a more advanced and well-maintained fleet including F-16s, the MAF is qualitatively inferior. While numerically superior to the Bangladesh Air Force in combat aircraft, chronic maintenance issues and the MAF's intense focus on internal conflict limit its ability to pose a conventional external threat. Its global positioning is one of growing isolation from the West, leading to an almost total dependence on Russia and China for new equipment, training, and political support. This reliance has solidified its pariah status but remains essential for its continued operations and survival.