Iran's nuclear program

Iran does not possess nuclear weapons, but stands closer to the threshold than any other non-nuclear state. Before June 2025 it had accumulated the essentials of a breakout capability: uranium enriched to 60 percent — a short technical step from weapons grade — advanced centrifuge cascades, and a missile force able to carry a warhead. US intelligence continued to assess that no weaponization decision had been made.

In June 2025 Israel, joined by US strikes on Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, attacked the program directly. The strikes destroyed or buried much of the enrichment infrastructure; Tehran says its enriched uranium lies under the rubble. The IAEA has since lost effective oversight: inspectors withdrew after the strikes, Iranian law suspended cooperation, and after February 2026 the agency reported it could no longer conduct verification in Iran at all. Some 440 kg of 60 percent uranium and 184 kg of 20 percent material remain unaccounted for, and UN sanctions returned in September 2025 through the JCPOA snapback mechanism.

Iran remains a party to the NPT and says its program is civilian. Whether it rebuilds — openly, covertly, or not at all — is the central proliferation question of the late 2020s.

A year on from the strikes, the picture is frozen: no verified enrichment, no inspector access, and an enriched-uranium stockpile whose condition only Tehran can assess. Parliament has debated NPT withdrawal without acting on it, talks with Washington have not resumed, and UN sanctions returned through the snapback in late 2025. Whether a reconstitution of the program would be detected in time is now the central question for Western intelligence services.