Iran's nuclear program
No weapon, no inspectors: Iran's 440.9 kg of 60 percent uranium has been unverified since June 2025, and two wars have left the IAEA without access to any enrichment site.
Iran's nuclear program today
As of early October 2026, Iran's nuclear program has no weapon and no inspectors. No source credits Iran with a weapon, and US intelligence reported in March 2026 no attempt to rebuild enrichment since June 2025. But the IAEA's last estimate of Iran's uranium enriched to 60 percent dates from 13 June 2025: 440.9 kg, enough, the IAEA Director General has said, for about ten weapons if enriched further. US and Israeli strikes in June 2025 and from 28 February 2026 destroyed or sealed the enrichment plants and ended IAEA verification; on 9 September 2026 the IAEA Board reported Iran's non-compliance to the UN Security Council.
It began under Atoms for Peace with a US agreement in 1957; Iran ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970. In August 2002 an exiled opposition group revealed the undeclared Natanz enrichment plant and the Arak heavy-water facility. A US National Intelligence Estimate of 3 December 2007 judged that Iran had halted its structured weapons effort in autumn 2003. UN Security Council sanctions followed from 2006, and on 25 September 2009 the US, UK and France revealed the undeclared Fordow plant. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 14 July 2015 capped enrichment at 3.67 percent, the stockpile at 300 kg and Natanz at 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges.
The United States withdrew from the JCPOA on 8 May 2018. Iran breached its limits in July 2019 and began enriching to 60 percent in April 2021; in early 2023 inspectors found particles enriched to 83.7 percent at Fordow. On 12 June 2025 the IAEA Board found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards. Israel began striking nuclear sites the next day, and on 22 June the United States hit Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan with fourteen GBU-57 bombs, twelve of them on Fordow. Inspectors withdrew by the end of the month, a law of 2 July 2025 suspended IAEA cooperation, and on 28 September 2025 the pre-2015 UN sanctions snapped back, which Iran rejects as void.
On 28 February 2026 the United States and Israel launched a second war on Iran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the opening strikes, and on 8 March his son Mojtaba Khamenei was named to succeed him. IAEA imagery recorded damage to the Natanz enrichment plant entrances, severe damage to the Arak heavy-water production plant and a damaged structure near the Bushehr reactor, which itself was not hit; an Israeli strike on 27 March destroyed the main building of the Ardakan yellowcake plant, and further centrifuge workshops at Karaj were destroyed in April. US intelligence assessed in May 2026 that the new nuclear damage was limited. After a ceasefire on 8 April, on 17 June President Trump and President Pezeshkian signed a memorandum of understanding under which the enriched stockpile was to be down-blended on site under IAEA supervision. On 8 July President Trump declared it over, and strikes resumed within a day.
As of early October 2026 the war continues and the IAEA has access to no enrichment-related site. The Agency believes a little over 200 kg of the 60 percent material lies in the Isfahan tunnel complex, unstruck and still under its seals; the Institute for Science and International Security puts the rest at Natanz and Fordow, behind entrances still buried in May 2026, and sees no evidence of enrichment. The Pickaxe Mountain tunnel complex south of Natanz is unstruck and still under construction. US intelligence and the Institute estimate about a year or more to a weapon if Iran decided to build one. NPT-withdrawal bills filed in March and September 2026 have not passed, and Mojtaba Khamenei has not reaffirmed his father's fatwa against nuclear weapons.
Iran's nuclear sites
| Site | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Natanz enrichment complex | Main enrichment plant (underground) and pilot plant | Struck 2025 and 2026 Struck June 2025; entrances hit again March 2026. Inaccessible, believed to hold some 60% uranium. |
| Fordow enrichment plant | 60% enrichment, 80–90 m under a mountain | Struck 2025 and 2026 Hit by 12 US GBU-57 bombs on 22 June 2025; tunnel entrances still buried in May 2026. |
| Isfahan nuclear technology center | Uranium conversion, fuel plants, tunnel storage | Struck 2025 Conversion and fuel plants hit June 2025. Tunnels holding most of the 60% stock not hit; IAEA seals reported intact. |
| Isfahan enrichment plant (IFEP) | Fourth enrichment plant, declared 12 June 2025 | Location undisclosed Never inspected; the IAEA does not know where it is. Iran says it was attacked. |
| Pickaxe Mountain (Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La) | Deep tunnel complex near Natanz, undeclared | Never struck Under construction since about 2020; never struck, no IAEA access. |
| Arak (Khondab) heavy-water complex | Heavy-water reactor and production plant | Struck 2025 and 2026 Reactor hit June 2025; heavy-water plant severely damaged 27 March 2026. |
| Ardakan yellowcake plant | Uranium ore processing | Struck 2026 Main processing building destroyed 27 March 2026. |
| Karaj and Tehran centrifuge workshops | Centrifuge manufacturing | Struck 2025 and 2026 Destroyed June 2025; further Karaj buildings destroyed April 2026. No IAEA access since 2021. |
| Bushehr nuclear power plant | Iran's only power reactor, Russian-built and fuelled | Reactor intact Reactor not hit; a structure about 350 m away was damaged in 2026. Inspected by the IAEA in June 2026. |
| Tehran Research Reactor | 5 MW research reactor, medical isotopes | Intact Unaffected by the 2025 and 2026 attacks. |
| Karun (Darkhovin) power plant | Power reactor at an early construction stage | Intact Missiles reported fired at the site on 19 July 2026; the IAEA found no damage. |
Enriched uranium and breakout time
| Location | Amount | Assessed by |
|---|---|---|
| Isfahan tunnels | A little over 200 kg | IAEA Director General, 2026 |
| Natanz (underground plant) | 74–96 kg | ISIS, June 2026 |
| Fordow | Up to 80 kg | ISIS, June 2026 |
| Date | Estimate | Source |
|---|---|---|
| July 2024 | 1–2 weeks to enough weapons-grade uranium | US Secretary of State |
| June 2025 | 2–3 days to the first 25 kg of weapons-grade uranium | ISIS |
| May 2026 | About a year to a weapon if decided | US intelligence, via Reuters |
| June 2026 | At least a year | ISIS |
Timeline of Iran's nuclear program
| 1957 | Civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States under Atoms for Peace. |
| 1970 | Parliament ratifies the Non-Proliferation Treaty. |
| 2002 | The undeclared Natanz enrichment plant and Arak heavy-water facility are revealed. |
| 2003 | The structured weapons effort is halted, per the 2007 US intelligence estimate. |
| 2006–2010 | Five UN Security Council resolutions demand an enrichment halt and impose sanctions. |
| 2009 | The undeclared Fordow enrichment plant is revealed. |
| 2015 | The JCPOA caps enrichment at 3.67% and the stockpile at 300 kg. |
| 2018 | The United States withdraws from the JCPOA. |
| 2021 | Enrichment to 60% begins; IAEA access to centrifuge workshops ends. |
| June 2025 | IAEA finds Iran in non-compliance; Israeli and US strikes hit Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan. |
| July 2025 | A new law suspends cooperation with the IAEA. |
| Sept 2025 | UN sanctions restored through the JCPOA snapback. |
| Feb 2026 | US-Israeli war on Iran begins; IAEA verification stops. |
| Mar 2026 | Natanz entrances, the Arak heavy-water plant and the Ardakan yellowcake plant are struck. |
| June 2026 | A US-Iran memorandum provides for down-blending the stockpile under IAEA supervision. |
| July 2026 | The memorandum collapses and hostilities resume. |
| Sept 2026 | The IAEA Board reports Iran to the UN Security Council; an NPT withdrawal bill is filed. |
Nuclear-capable missiles
| Non-Proliferation Treaty | Party; referred to the UN Security Council, 2026 |
| Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) | Signed, not ratified |
| Prohibition Treaty (TPNW) | Not party |
Frequently Asked Questions
Does Iran have nuclear weapons?
No. As of early October 2026, no source credits Iran with a nuclear weapon, and the US Director of National Intelligence testified in March 2026 that Iran had not tried to rebuild its enrichment capability since the June 2025 strikes. The IAEA, however, has had no access to Iran's enrichment sites since June 2025 and has formally stated it cannot verify that no nuclear material has been diverted.
How close is Iran to a nuclear bomb?
Before June 2025 US officials put Iran's breakout time for enough fissile material at one to two weeks. After the strikes of 2025 and 2026, US intelligence and the Institute for Science and International Security both estimate, as of mid-2026, about a year or more to build a weapon if Iran decided to, because its enrichment plants are destroyed or sealed and its centrifuge workshops wrecked. The unknowns are the roughly 440 kg of 60 percent uranium, enough for about ten weapons if enriched further, and whether an undeclared enrichment site exists.
Where is Iran's enriched uranium?
Nobody has verified it since June 2025. The IAEA believes a little over 200 kg of the 440.9 kg of 60 percent uranium is in the Isfahan tunnel complex, under seals it says remain in place, with the rest at Natanz and Fordow. The Institute for Science and International Security reported in June 2026 that the tunnel entrances at all three sites were still sealed, as they had been before the March 2026 strikes.
Was Fordow destroyed?
Largely, as an enrichment plant. Twelve US GBU-57 bombs struck it on 22 June 2025, and the IAEA Director General said in September 2025 that almost all its sensitive equipment had been destroyed. Support buildings were hit again in March 2026, and its four tunnel entrances remained buried as of mid-May 2026; the Institute for Science and International Security estimates up to 80 kg of 60 percent uranium may still be inside.
What did the 2026 war do to Iran's nuclear program?
Nuclear sites were struck again, but the main enrichment facilities had already been destroyed in 2025. The IAEA confirmed damage to the Natanz plant entrances, severe damage to the Arak heavy-water production plant and a damaged structure near the Bushehr reactor; the Ardakan yellowcake plant and further centrifuge workshops at Karaj were also destroyed; US intelligence judged the extra damage limited. The war also ended IAEA verification entirely, killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and revived NPT-withdrawal moves in parliament.
Is Iran still in the NPT?
Yes, as of early October 2026. Withdrawal bills were introduced in March and September 2026, but neither has passed, a bill would also need Guardian Council approval, and withdrawal requires three months' notice. Iran rejects the snapback of UN sanctions as void and gives the IAEA no access to its enrichment-related sites, but its safeguards agreement remains in force.
What was the JCPOA?
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, concluded on 14 July 2015 between Iran and the P5+1, capped enrichment at 3.67 percent and the stockpile at 300 kg and limited Natanz to 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges, in exchange for sanctions relief. The United States withdrew on 8 May 2018 and Iran exceeded the limits from July 2019. Its UN sanctions relief was reversed by the snapback of 28 September 2025.
- OCT 72026 Updated Overview rewritten through October 2026; nuclear sites map, uranium stockpile, breakout estimates and timeline added
- AUG 102026 Updated Nuclear overview updated
- MAR 172026 Updated Nuclear overview updated
- JAN 202026 Updated Nuclear overview updated